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Abstract: This work widens the trajectory of research in media ethics 
and performance in West Africa by examining the role violence plays in 
the way civil society actors relate with journalists in Ghana’s Northern 
Region. Findings from in-depth interviews with broadcast stations’ staff 
in the region show that they adhere to the principle of self-censorship to 
avoid attacks, not from the expected sources of overzealous government 
agents or overbearing media owners, but some civil society actors. The 
experiences of broadcasters in the Tamale metropolis indicate that the 
intimidation of journalists on duty is still a common occurrence, their 
compliance with some ethical principles notwithstanding. One 
ramification of this is that government agencies and media stakeholders, 
professional associations, in particular, must wake up to the 
responsibility of protecting the interests of journalists in all areas, press 
freedom inclusive. 
Keywords: Media freedom, civil society actors, violence, censorship, 
Northern Ghana. 
    1 
Introduction 
Like previous works (e.g. 
Tettey, 2001; Diedong, 2016; 
Nyarko and Akpojivi, 2017), 
this study assumes that freedom 
of the press is essential to the 
proper functioning of Ghana’s 
growing democracy, especially 
in the context of the 
Habermasian public sphere. It 
also assumes that the press 
informs citizen participation in 
the nation’s democracy, and acts 
as a watchdog on the State and 
powerful interests. 
 
Therefore, the Ghana's 2018 
Reporters Without Borders’ 
ranking as number one in Africa 
and 23 in the world in terms of 
press freedom and celebrated as a 
remarkable achievement (Reporters 
Without Borders, 2018) may be 
epistemologically fragile. The 
generalized perspectives on the 
freedom enjoyed by the media do 
obfuscate the contrasting realities 
in some parts of the country.  
 
We assert in this study that media 
freedom is currently attenuated in 
the Northern Region of Ghana in a 
manner that is peculiar and 
deserves scholarly attention. 
Precisely, this study speaks to the 
phenomenon whereby civil society 
elements forcibly weaken broadcast 
media freedom in the Northern 
Region and consequently, the 
effects of same on the ability of 
broadcast media to function 
effectively as a Habermasian public 
sphere. As conceptualized by 
Habermas (1989), the public sphere 
is a space outside the control of the 
State and corporate interests 
wherein citizens can freely engage 
in discourse about matters of public 
interest. The voice in the public 
sphere is, therefore, a critical rather 
than deferential voice. Habermas 
idealized the space of an active, 
participative 18th-century 
bourgeois public sphere in contrast 
to the elite-dominated 
contemporary commodified and 
corporatized public spheres. This 
idealized public sphere is, 
therefore, the standard against 
which an active, critical mass 
media is measured. 
 
As Avle notes of the radio medium, 
“It plays a preeminent role in 
Ghana’s broadcast mediascape, 
compared to television and the print 
media” (2011, p.4).  Owing to 
factors such as literacy rates, 
internet penetration, portability and 
unreliable power supply (Walsh, 
2017), radio is the dominant mass 
medium in Ghana (Mu-azu and 
Shivram, 2017) with almost 63 
percent of the audience share 
(MFWA, 2017). The Northern 
Regional capital of Tamale and its 
environs are awash with local FM 
stations, ranging from State-owned 
public service-oriented stations to 
commercial, community, and 
campus radio stations (Mu-azu and 
Shivram, 2017). The city of Tamale 
is a fast-growing cosmopolitan 
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center of northern Ghana 
(Phyfferoen, 2012). It has 
historically been a political capital, 
from the pre-independence 
Northern Territories days to the 
post-colonial period and the 
evolution of the current 
configuration of the Northern 
Region. Following the 
liberalization of the airwaves in the 
nineties, which made private 
ownership of broadcasting 
undertakings possible (Boateng, 
2009; Walsh, 2017), radio has 
contributed to Tamale’s 
cosmopolitanism and of the 48 
officially licensed radio stations in 
the region, 27 operate from Tamale 
or adjacent districts with the 
Tamale urban space as the targeted 
market. There has never been any 
sustained publication of print media 
from Tamale as all the newspapers 
tend to originate in southern Ghana 
with limited circulation in the 
north. 
 
Field research conducted in the 
northern regions (Savannah, 
Northern, North East, Upper East, 
and Upper West Regions) showed 
that the radio continues to be the 
primary source of information for 
most rural folks in the Northern 
Region. About 89.56 percent of 
males and 87 percent of females 
indicated they were using the radio 
as their primary source of 
information (Alhassan et.al, 2016, 
p.33). The majority of the radio 
broadcasts are transmitted from the 
studios in either Tamale or nearby 
Savelugu, Sagnarigu, Tolon, and 
Kumbungu Districts. Drawing on 
public sphere literature (e.g. 
Habermas, 1989; Boateng, 2009; 
Nyarko, 2016), it can be said that 
radio is part of the nation’s media 
ecology and thus constitutes a 
critical space for public discourse 
in Ghana.  
 
The Problem Statement 
In the recent times, there have been 
some reported attacks on radio 
stations in and around Tamale, with 
consequences such as media 
workers sustaining injuries, 
interruption of live broadcasts, and 
destruction of broadcast equipment 
or vehicles of on-air panel 
discussants. The origins of the 
practice of studio attacks may be 
difficult to establish, but the most 
dramatic and most visible was a 
March 11, 2014 incident at Radio 
Justice in Tamale (Gadugah, 2014), 
which has been dubbed the 
microcosm of these attacks. Radio 
Justice was again attacked on 
December 2, 2017 (MFWA, 2017). 
This occurrence is significant 
because the attacks are traceable 
not to the usual culprits – 
government agents – but non-State 
actors.  
 
These problematic occurrences 
have impacted program schedules, 
choice of talk show topics, the 
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willingness of radio guests to 
engage in panel discussions on 
sensitive subjects and the readiness 
of station managers to enforce a 
form of self-censorship for their 
stations. There is also a growing 
perception in and around Tamale 
that radio is not just a site for the 
contestation of ideas leading to the 
formation of public opinion in a 
typical Habermasian sense of the 
public sphere (Livingstone and 
Lunt, 1994; Garnham, 2007) but 
that it is also fertile ground for 
growing the seeds of violent 
conflict. This perception was 
reinforced by a National Peace 
Council Conflict Map synopsis of 
2008 which noted that: 
In the Tamale metropolis, 
political conflicts occurred in 
Gumbihini, Choggu, and 
Changli as a result of political 
rivalries between the two 
main parties. The conflict was 
pre-election violence between 
supporters of the NDC 
(National Democratic 
Congress) and the NPP (New 
Patriotic Party  in which 26 
houses were burnt in the 
Choggu Hill Top and Choggu 
Manayili areas. The conflict 
emanated from a radio station 
discussion between the 
activists of the two main 
political parties. It resulted in 
an argument between butchers 
in the Tamale Central Market. 
This led to a conflict among 
the butchers which resulted in 
the death of a colleague 
butcher who was an NDC 
sympathizer. The NDC 
organized, attacked and burnt 
the home of one of the 
panelists on the radio 
discussion who was seen as an 
NPP person. (National Peace 
Council, 2018). 
From this National Peace Council 
synopsis, one gathers that 
exercising speech rights during a 
radio panel discussion makes 
discussants vulnerable to physical 
attacks. This means that any 
audience member who feels 
aggrieved by radio discussions 
could resort to violence instead of 
using legal means of redress such 
as rejoinders, rebuttals or litigation.  
 
Literature Review: The State, 
Capital, and Civil Society Vortex 
and the Media 
One remarkable feature of Ghana's 
Fourth Republican Constitution is 
the extensive provisions it makes 
for the protection of media 
freedoms. Chapter 12 of the 
Constitution is entirely devoted to 
"Freedom and Independence of the 
Media" and has six provisions 
guaranteeing the independence of 
the media, proscribing censorship, 
and establishing that no law shall 
be made to require publishers to be 
licensed. It guarantees the right to 
rejoinder as a means of 
compensating for media excesses. 
The chapter also states that "editors 
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and publishers of newspapers and 
other institutions of the mass media 
shall not be subject to control or 
interference by government, nor 
shall they be penalized or harassed 
for their editorial opinions and 
views, or the content of their 
publications” (Constitution of 
Ghana, 1992, Article 4). Article 5 
adds that “All agencies of the mass 
media shall, at all times, be free to 
uphold the principles, provisions, 
and objectives of this Constitution, 
and shall uphold the responsibility 
and accountability of the 
Government to the people of 
Ghana” (Constitution of Ghana, 
1992, Article 5).  
 
The 1992 Constitution was 
produced against the backdrop of a 
consistent record of governmental 
interference, and control of media 
in Ghana. The country had recently 
experienced a decade of military 
dictatorship and what is described 
as a consequent “culture of silence” 
(Ankomah, 1987; Serlomey, 2012: 
p.2; Odartey-Wellington et al, 
2017, p.304). Thus, the 
constitutional provisions referenced 
are crafted to protect the citizens’ 
media rights from State abuse. It 
would appear therefore that the 
private sector entrepreneur who 
invests in media industries and civil 
society actors, amongst others, was 
never envisioned by this 
constitution as a potential abuser of 
media freedoms. Thus, the 
protection of media freedoms, to 
the extent that the citizen’s abilities 
to transmit and receive mass media 
content are safeguarded, is 
concerned with threats from the 
State - with the government and its 
coercive apparatus as potential 
threat sources. Hence, it appears 
justifiable to focus on the State and 
its agents as the potential abusers of 
press freedom. The Media 
Foundation for West Africa’s 
(MFWA) periodic West Africa Free 
Expression Monitor has since 2014 
corroborated this in its reports (See 
http://www.mfwa.org/publication-
type/reports/). Abusers of media 
freedom in this context have the 
intention of attenuating media 
agency and re-structuring 
journalistic practice by forcibly 
limiting the scope of media 
discourse or shaping public 
discourse in the media. 
 
Using the MFWA published data 
on violations of media freedom in 
West Africa for the years 2014, 
2015 and 2016 (MFWA 2014; 
MFWA 2015; MFWA 2016), the 
following chart is constructed to 
graphically present threats from 
dimensions of a democratic society, 
namely the State, Capital and Civil 
Society. The MFWA data isolates 8 
actors for tabulating sources of 
threats to media freedoms. These 
are 1. Police/Security forces, 2. 
State officials, 3. Regulatory 
bodies, 4. Political party affiliates, 
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5. Media owners, 6. Organized 
groups, 7, Courts and 8. Other 
individuals. We found out that 
these categories can be re-grouped 
into the three blocs of State, 
Capital and Civil Society. Thus, in 
our re-configuration, we grouped 
police/security forces, state 
officials, courts and regulatory 
bodies, into State and State 
apparatus agents. The category of 
media owners was retained as a 
category for Capital. Political party 
affiliates, organized groups, and 
other individuals constituted the 
category of Civil Society. Thus in 
this reconfigured typology, the 
following is the outcome of the re-
tabulation of the MFWA data into 
the State, Capital (media owners), 
and Civil Society for West Africa.
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Composite Chart of Violations of Media in West Africa 
 
In Figure 1, the State remains the 
dominant abuser of media freedom 
in all countries of West Africa, 
except Burkina Faso.  The situation 
in Ghana is consistent with the 
West African pattern. However, the 
record of civil society actors is 
quite revealing in terms of the 
emerging threats to media freedoms 
and this is what this work focuses 
on. The experience of the Northern 
Region, being used as a case study 
in this paper thus allows 
highlighting civil society as an 
unexpected emerging threat to 
media freedoms. 
 
Johan Galtung’s (1999) model of 
media and society offers a 
normative framework whereby the 
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media is located in a hegemonic 
triangular vortex constituted by 
State, Capital and Civil Society. 
We draw on this framework to 
understand the condition of the 
media in Ghana's democracy. In 
Galtung’s formulation, the three 
units of society compete to exert 
influence on the media, as it is the 
channel of public communication 
(1999, p.9). Where a strong State 
exists, the media is likely to 
gravitate toward State interests. 
This can be in the form of exclusive 
State ownership of the media or 
fear of the coercive power of the 
State, both of which were 
observable in Ghana before media 
liberalization (Hasty, 2005). 
Referencing Habermas (1989), an 
inference can be made from those 
circumstances, for example, that 
“the State-owned media played a 
‘representational’ rather than a 
critical function vis-à-vis State 
power” (Odartey-Wellington et al, 
2017, p.304).  In an environment of 
a strong Market/Capital dominance 
over State and Civil Society, the 
media would be seen as being 
subservient to the wishes of 
corporate interests through the 
power of advertising funds or the 
ownership structures (McChesney, 
2015). 
 
In Galtung’s taxonomy, Civil 
Society appears to be the weakest 
of these three institutional elements 
(1999, p.12). One of the reasons 
why Galtung considers the category 
of Civil Society to be weak is that 
both the State and Market equally 
have representation in Civil Society 
in the form of Civil Society 
organizations (CSOs) and adjuncts. 
We diagrammatically represent 
Galtung’s model as follows to 
demonstrate the triangular vortex.  
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          Figure 2: Diagram of Media in a State, Market and Civil Society vortex 
 
Literature abounds on how the 
State and Capital leverage power to 
dominate or influence the media 
(Herman and Chomsky, 1988; 
McChesney, 2015; Mentan, 2015; 
Ogola, 2017; Mwakideu, 2017; 
Kruger, 2017). But there is little 
focus on how Civil Society 
elements shape media content or 
practice. This study adopts the 
position that the impact of Civil 
Society actors on media freedoms 
also deserves attention. This is 
pertinent concerning the recent 
dynamics observable in the 
Northern Region of Ghana.  
 
For about a decade, while State 
actors in the region have largely 
respected media freedoms, Civil 
Society actors have emerged as a 
new source of systemic and 
structural media repression. Lately, 
almost all radio stations located in 
the vicinity of the regional capital 
Tamale have adopted self-
censorship strategies to avoid 
provoking diverse vigilante groups 
including political militias, 
activists, sports or religious 
fanatics, and partisans in 
chieftaincy conflicts. This study, 
therefore, focuses on the activities 
of civil society elements that are 
prone to use of violence in their 
dealings with the media and the 
ramification of this violent 
behavior in Ghana's Northern 
Region.  
 
Objectives of the study 
The objectives of this study are the 
following: 
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1. To examine the media-
violence nexus, the impact of 
this nexus, including how it 
shapes the practice of 
journalism and media work in 
the Northern Region of Ghana.  
2. To verify the anecdotal 
evidence that the specter of 
violence from either known or 
unknown Civil Society groups 
has led to deliberate acts of 
media self-censorship.  
 
Research questions 
The questions framing this research 
are: 
1. What is the extent and impact 
of civil society actor-initiated 
violence on the media in the 
Northern Region? 
2. How are media gatekeepers 
responding to the phenomenon 
of civil society-led violence on 
the media?  
3. Have certain topics become 
taboo for news coverage or 
commentary due to the specter 
of violent attacks from Civil 
Society elements?  
 
Rationale and Significance of the 
Study 
The focus on the Northern Region 
is important not just because of the 
region's significance to the overall 
health of the nation but also 
because of its geographical distance 
from what is concerned the political 
and economic center of the nations. 
There is a legitimate concern that 
the issues identified in the paper 
may not be adequately accounted 
for by policy-makers. As well, 
historically, northern Ghana has 
suffered from economic and 
developmental disparities vis-à-vis 
the southern regions and the 
absence of a vibrant media 
environment potentially 
exacerbates these disparities. One 
of the consequences of these 
disparities is that the region is also 
home to civil society-based 
'vigilante' groups, often mobilized 
for violent action (Oteng-Ababio, 
2016), including threats to the 
media. This study contributes to 
discussions on how Civil 
Society actors are increasingly 
becoming sources of the 
challenges that media face in the 
course of their duties. 
 
Method 
In-depth interviews were conducted 
with the management members of 
nine local radio stations, as well as 
15 reporters in the Tamale vicinity 
between January and March 2018. 
The study also included interviews 
with law enforcement officers on 
factors that militate against the 
successful investigation of violent 
crimes against the media in the 
area. Table 1 below is the list of 
media houses whose staff were 
interviewed.
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            Table 1: List of Radio Stations whose journalists were interviewed 
 Name of station Category and ownership 
1.  Zaa Radio Private/ commercial 
2. Radio Savannah State/Public service 
3.  Radio Justice Private/Commercial 
4. Diamond FM Private /Commercial 
5.  Might FM Private /Commercial 
6. North Star  Private/Commercial 
7. Fila FM Private/Commercial 
8.  Bishara Radio Private/Commercial 
9. Tawasul Radio Community  
 
The focus of the study crystallized 
out of an attempt to understand 
why local FM stations increasingly 
avoided comprehensive coverage of 
certain issues. 
 
In 2017, the frequency of abuse of 
media escalated. The following is a 
list of some of the discursive 
moments which were used as 
reference points for the interviews: 
 April 4, 2017, a radio DJ was 
lured to a location and 
assaulted for making what was 
considered derogatory 
comments about local 
video/film actors. 
 August 24, 2017, Tawasul 
Community FM was attacked, 
staff assaulted and equipment 
vandalized leading to the 
unscheduled termination of a 
live sports program.  
 September 4, 2017, an NDC 
communicator was assaulted at 
Bishara Radio for comments 
he made during a live 
program. 
 December 2, 2017, Radio 
Justice was attacked, 
equipment vandalized and a 
panelist assaulted during a live 
discussion on Dagbon 
chieftaincy issues. The 
transmission was terminated. 
For Radio Justice, this was a 
repeat of the March 11, 2014 
attack during which vehicles 
and property were torched in 
an apparent protest against a 
live panel discussion 
broadcast. 
All these cases were reported to 
law enforcement but investigations 
stalled as no prosecutions were 
carried out. Several other threats of 
violence have led to the termination 
of broadcasts but were not been 
reported to law enforcement. In all 
of these cases, we saw that neither 
agents of the State nor Capital were 
involved. However, in all cases, we 
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identified Civil Society agents as 
perpetrators. 
 
 
Findings and Discussion 
A common thread in the responses 
analyzed in this study suggests that 
the phenomenon of organized 
violence against the media from 
Civil Society groups is real. The 
staff and management of the nine 
radio stations acknowledged that 
this jeopardizes the independence 
of the media in and around Tamale. 
A journalist at Radio Justice said: 
“When you come across a story on 
certain topics in the region, you 
have to ask yourself if your editor 
or manager will allow you to work 
on it.” In response to a 
complementary question asking 
why he said: “It is for the security 
of the station and myself." The 
specter of insecurity here is in 
reference not to the State or 
Capital, but Civil Society actors. 
 
Radio Justice has been attacked 
three times since 2004. On all three 
occasions, the management of the 
station has claimed that the 
attackers were unknown. One 
interviewee said: "No. As for that 
one, we don't know them; we 
address them as unknown persons 
that came. In all the three, the first 
one it was a media war, the second 
one they were many so we couldn't 
identify them - like a community 
coming to attack” (Radio Justice 
Interview). The failure or inability 
to identify perpetrators does not 
appear to be an accurate answer 
from the interviewee. Earlier in the 
interview, he had admitted that 
Tamale is a place where 
“everybody knows everyone.” In an 
environment of impunity and 
intricate social relations, 
identifying the perpetrators is itself 
is a security hazard (Odartey-
Wellington et al, 2017).  
 
Thus, the inability of a media 
executive to publicly identify 
perpetrators of media violence is a 
function of the dominance of Civil 
Society elements in muzzling the 
media, which is not guaranteed 
protection by law enforcement. The 
responses of some of the journalists 
interviewed corroborated the 
perception that the perpetrators are 
known. It is the fear of being 
identified as a whistle-blower or 
‘snitch’ that keeps them from 
putting on record with the identities 
of perpetrators. And in some 
instances, the perpetrators keep 
their records of notoriety as a badge 
of honor and would remind peers or 
opponents of such records. Indeed, 
in the arson attacks on Radio 
Justice depicted in the following 
images, the identities of the 
arsonists were common knowledge, 
but neither law enforcement nor the 
victims were willing to pursue the 
matter through a judicial process. 
    11 
  
Figure 3: Images of violence and arson visited on a media house in Tamale 
(Source: Management of Radio Justice) 
 
All the 15 journalists interviewed 
agreed about the existence of an 
unofficial list of taboo topics. The 
commonly identified topic was 
Dagbon chieftaincy issues. 
Specifically, debates about 
chieftaincy issues, particularly 
those that bordered on Abudu and 
Andani were seen as clear taboos. 
The subject of traditional politics is 
also articulated to national partisan 
politics and lines are often blurred 
when attacks occur. What is clear, 
however, is that these attacks occur 
and are driven by audience 
grievances over the content. The 
Manager of North Star FM in the 
interview reported that the station 
has experienced two attacks in 
recent years even though checks 
with the police disclosed three 
attacks on the record. According to 
the manager: 
 
I’m a management member 
and only came to manage 
this place from June this 
year but the previous 
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managers or directors were 
attacked. The station started 
at the road leading to the 
School of Hygiene thus the 
Zogyiri area. People 
besieged the place throwing 
stones. I can’t remember 
when, though that was the 
first time. The second attack 
was about two years ago. 
I’ve always been a director 
of the company but because 
of certain crises here I was 
brought in to streamline 
things. One attack was in the 
day time but we fought them 
back. One of them [the 
attackers] was late to start 
his motorcycle … and they 
took to their heels. Certain 
discussions were going on 
here concerning chieftaincy 
and other things and I think 
they didn't like it.  
Alhaji Aliu Mahama, Vice 
President of Ghana from 2000-
2008, established North Star FM as 
a private venture while he was in 
office. It was during his tenure that 
Ya Na Yakubu Andani II, the 
traditional king of Dagbon and 
several people were killed in what 
was seen as a chieftaincy clash (see 
endnote 3). It was seen by many as 
an Abudu attack on the Andani 
faction of the Dagbon traditional 
governance. This was because the 
Abudus were regarded as being 
pro-NPP and the Andanis, pro-
NDC.  The popular perception also 
was that the NPP, and by extension, 
Mahama, was sympathetic to the 
Abudu cause (Albert, 2008, p.52). 
The North Star FM station was 
therefore seen as an Abudu 
platform. As the station’s manager 
put it: “You see, this station is 
branded as Abudu and an NPP 
sympathizer so there were 
supporters of NDC who did that 
[the attack on the station] ... 
Because if people are discussing 
things and they are not insulting 
anybody, just a general discussion 
like the Radio Justice one, and you 
don’t like what is being discussed 
do you have to attack? You don’t 
do that.” 
 
National politics and traditional 
politics are not the only precursors 
of radio station attacks in Tamale. 
On August 24, 2017, an official of 
Tamale local football club attacked 
the host of a live program at 
Tawasul Community FM for 
discussing match-fixing allegations 
against the club. The official was 
invited to phone-in or come to the 
studio to respond to the match-
fixing allegations. He, however, 
attended at the station with two 
well-built minders (hired thugs 
colloquially referred to in Ghana as 
"macho men") to violently attack 
the host for daring to mention his 
name on air. This was reported to 
the police while the host was 
evacuated to the hospital.  
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The next day, the errant official 
brought in some community leaders 
to apologize for his actions and 
agreed to pay compensation for the 
trauma suffered by the vhost and 
equipment damage. According to 
the management, the arbitration 
process was facilitated by the 
police, a claim that the police did 
not corroborate when we 
interviewed them. The police, 
however, confirmed that parties in 
these cases were often reluctant to 
opt for a criminal prosecution, 
rather favoring amicable 
settlements that are not precluded 
under the Ghanaian criminal law if 
the offenses fall in the realm of 
misdemeanors. In more serious 
cases, the police admit being 
unable to apprehend culprits due to 
the lack of community cooperation. 
Interestingly, the promise of 
compensation in the Tawasul case 
did not materialize and it appears 
that the police have discontinued 
with the case. To the extent that 
debt-collection is not a remit of law 
enforcement, the police argued that 
their options are limited when 
parties default on amicable 
settlements in this context. 
 
Management staff interviewed 
acknowledged that they take 
precautionary measures to ensure 
that they do not offend certain 
identified community elements for 
fear of incurring their wrath. Of the 
15 journalists we talked to, only 
two claimed that their work is 
unaffected by the fear of these 
community elements. The two 
agree that when their copy is not 
included in bulletins by their local 
stations due to concerns about 
potential Civil Society taboo topics, 
they send these stories for use by 
media organizations outside the 
region. Acknowledging this implies 
the existence within their local 
stations of regulatory practices (that 
could be categorized as self-
censorship) as a result of the de 
facto 'regulatory' regime imposed 
on them by Civil Society elements. 
One manager of an FM station, 
after requesting anonymity before 
the interview, said "We do not do 
local programming. We give the 
news and do sports and then 
national politics and music. No 
local issues." Asked why he said: 
"The local people are not 
predictable. If you imagine what 
has happened to other stations in 
the past for very simple issues, you 
wonder what koraa (at all) is wrong 
with them.” 
 
From the responses of both 
journalists and the management, 
the list of subjects considered taboo 
includes chieftaincy issues, 
controversies over sports, and 
issues that engage linkages between 
traditional and national political 
cleavages. Interestingly, while the 
NPP is branded Abudu and the 
NDC is seen as being Andani-
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biased, these perceived alliances 
are social constructions and do not 
mean that all members of each of 
the parties identify with the 
corresponding chieftaincy faction. 
Consequently, strictly speaking, 
partisan political discussions are 
not considered sensitive enough to 
cause media to engage in self-
censorship. The partisan political 
discussion becomes problematic 
and toxic only when they are 
connected to local chieftaincy 
politics. Yet, while these matters 
appear to be provocative, they are 
also very important topics of 
discussion. A failure to discuss 
them openly does not wish them 
away. On the contrary, these issues 
have often materialized as social 
implosions that have negatively 
impacted socio-economic 
development in the North (IRIN 
2003). 
 
While this study confirms the 
existence of Civil Society 
censorship of media as a 
phenomenon in the Northern 
Region, it also suggests a failure of 
the State to guarantee the safety of 
broadcasters in the Tamale 
metropolis, and confirms the 
suggestion by study respondents of 
the existence of a state of impunity. 
As the manager of Radio Justice 
noted, "if you [the State] don’t 
arrest, how then do you start a 
judicial process?”  Further, he 
suggested a reticence by media 
owners to expose media holdings to 
economic loss resulting either from 
loss of advertising revenue when 
broadcasts are suspended, when 
equipment and infrastructure are 
damaged, or when budget lines 
have to be created for target 
hardening as a security measure. 
Another manager starkly also 
noted, “we can’t afford security for 
24 hour-service [-programming].” 
As the manager of Tawasul Radio 
added: 
In the Northern Region, 
Tamale per se, we the media 
houses are in trouble. I think 
though I’m yet to meet other 
media personnel to set up a 
union should something like 
this happen they can fight 
for the affected people. The 
absence of the union is 
making people attack media 
houses because no one is 
there to fight for us, Tamale 
is becoming unbecoming 
that people take the law into 
their hands and do whatever 
they want. And the media 
plays a greater responsibility 
in this particular region but I 
don’t know why they don’t 
regard us. So either the 
problem is coming from us 
or just within the region 
itself, the higher authority 
has emboldened them. For 
instance, just three days ago, 
the same thing happened to 
Justice FM and when the 
issue came up it is like one 
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particular gate… came and 
did that which is alarming 
and something must be 
done. There should be a 
collective responsibility like 
a union. There should be a 
rule to protect the interest of 
media houses.   
While this approach could be 
helpful, it is curious that broadcast 
media workers are oblivious to the 
function of the Ghana Journalists 
Association (GJA) in protecting 
members in all regions. In all of 
these occurrences in the Northern 
Region, the GJA appeared to be a 
distant factor in the equation, 
signaling a need for the body to 
refocus its efforts in ensuring the 
protection of broadcast media 
workers in that part of Ghana. The 
current practice of self-censorship 
is inconsistent with media norms as 
a fourth estate and public sphere. 
Indeed, it is inconsistent with the 
Habermas' conceptualization of the 
public sphere as an unfettered 
space for public discourse anchored 
in civil society. 
 
Conclusion and 
Recommendations 
This study has engaged with the 
phenomenon whereby civil society 
elements forcibly attenuate press 
freedom in the Northern Region, 
consequently, curtailing the ability 
of broadcast media to function 
effectively as a Habermasian 
public sphere. We have shown that 
broadcasters in Tamale were 
compelled to engage in self-
censorship to avoid attracting 
violent attacks from the civil 
society characters, thereby 
expanding the trajectory of media 
censorship research beyond the 
paradigm of state or capital 
dominance over the media. 
 
This study confirms Nyarko and 
Akpojivi's (2017) observation that 
provocation often lies at the root of 
the media intimidation and attacks 
in Ghana to the extent that, in the 
context of this study, some 
audiences object to reportage or 
discussions of certain topics on the 
radio in Tamale. What is intriguing 
is that this study is against the 
backdrop of Ghana's celebration as 
an African success story 
concerning media freedom. While 
we did not set out to examine the 
methodology of the Reporters 
Without Borders' ranking, a cursory 
view of its 87-question instrument 
of evaluation is heavily skewed at 
identifying abuses perpetrated by 
the State. As noted in the review of 
Ghana's Constitution, the focus on 
the state as a likely abuser of press 
freedoms can obfuscate non-state 
actors who are emerging sources of 
media freedom abuses. It is against 
this backdrop that we recommend 
that: 
1. The law enforcement agencies 
should always act in cases of 
attacks on media in the 
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Northern Region and media 
should publicize these attacks 
as well as the status of 
resultant law enforcement 
action (or lack of action).  
2. The GJA should play an active 
role in acting against impunity 
and ensuring law enforcement 
accountability.  They should 
be seen as the protectors of the 
interest of their members. 
3. As captured in the interviews, 
the sense of impunity is the 
strongest factor creating the 
state of insecurity that Tamale 
broadcasters are experiencing. 
That, therefore, should be the 
focus of the government’s 
intervention if local 
broadcasters are to function 
effectively.
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